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In the Supre1t1e Court of the

State of Utah

WILLIAM H. STEELE and MELVA R.
STEELE,
Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
vs.
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, and WEYHER
CONSTRUCITON COMPANY,

\

CASE
NO. 10,063

Defendants,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a collision between the Plaintiffs'
pickup truck and Defendants', Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, train at a constructioo site
maintained and controlled by Defendant, Weyher Con-

struction Company.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court, upon a motion fO!r summary judgment made by borth Defendants and upon oral argument
of the same, granted said motion with respect to Defendant, Weyher Construction Company as to bort:h plaintiffs
and further granted said motion with respect to Defendant, Denver and Rio Grande Weste·rn Railroad Company,
as to Plaintiff William H. Steele, and Plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs see·k reversal of the lower ·court's order
granting motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

and

The Plaintiffs are residents of Springville, Utah,
have been for .a great number of years. On the day of
the accident, October 19, 1961, the Plaintiffs were on their
way from their home in Springville to the Wildwood Nursery in Orem, Utah. The purpose of their trip being to
pick up some shrubbery and flowers at the Wildwood Nursery and to return to Springville. In order for them to arrive at their appointed destination, they traveled down
Highway 91 to Provo, and from Provo down to what is
commonly known as the Geneva Road, or Utah Highway
No. 114. This highway travels west orf Provo in a northsouth direction. Mter traveling north on this highway
for a distance of about three miles, they reached what
would be 13th South, in O:rem, Utah, and they turned on
thie:·road east and proceeded toward the Wildwood Nursery, which is located about one mile east of the Geneva
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Road.

As they proceeded east on 13th South, they observed what appeared to them to be construction work
taking place on the 13th South Road. As they drew nearer
to the construction area, they saw a sign and barricade
across 13th South, which informed them that the road was
closed. At the western end of the construction area, the
Plaintiffs could see what appeared to be a detour road
which turned off to the south of the oiled portion of 13th
South and along the southern edge of the construction

area, which construction the Plaintiffs later determined
to be an overpass over the railroad tracks of the Denver
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company.

This gra-

veled road onto which Plaintiffs had turned, thinking it

to be a detour around the construction area was constructed in such a manner that a car traveling down the road
could not see to the north and observe the approach of any
trains which might be traveling south on the said railroad
tracks. As the Plaintiffs proceeded down this graveled
road, they were unaware of any impending danger and in
fact the Plaintiff, William R. Steele, did not realize that
there were railroad tracks lying in front of him. The first
warning that Plaintiffs had that they were in any danger
was at a point about ten feet from the railroad tracks when
they heard a noise and looked up and saw the train about
to strike their pickup.

This warning came too late and

the train collided with the pickup, knocking it down the
tracks and totally demolishing the truck itself.

Both the

Plaintiffs suffered serious injury and were taken to the
Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, Utah.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NEITHER
OF THE DEFENDANTS OWED A [)ilJTY TO THE
PLAINTIFFS INSOFAR AS CONSTRUCTION OF THE
BYPASS ROAD WAS CONCERNED.
The record will disclose that the court in its pre-trial
forund that the Defendants owed no duty to the Plaintiffs with respect to construction of the bypass road. We
respectfully submit that this was in error.

o~der

As the Plaintiffs proceeded to drive up 13th South
after turning east off from the the Geneva Road, they
were confronted with an area which was under construction. The road on which they were traveling was barricaded off and marked "Road Closed". As the Plaintiffs
neared the construction area and read the aborve sign, they
observed a graveled road which turned off to the south
of the construction area and then proceeded on east. This
was a graveled road whieh was graded off in a level condition and looked like one which was to be used as a detour around the construction site. Subsequent investigation has shown that the road was not a detour, but that it
was built for the use of both of the Defendants in connection with the construction of the overpass over the railroad tracks; however, the mere fact that the road was a
private one meant for the use of the Defendants in connection with the construction project does not eliminate
a duty towards the Pl<aintiffs.
· - This graveled road was constructed in such a manner and placed at such a point that it appeared to be a
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detow- for traffic going east on 13th South, and the Plain-tit1s llll~rely acted as reasonable people in assuming this
lu be the case. By constructing this road in the manner
in which they did and in placing it at this particular point,
the Defendants had created a situation amounting to a
hidden or dangerous trap for the unwary traveler. This
seemed to be nothing more than a simple detour road, which
was meant for the traveler's use in proceeding around the
construction site. After starting down this road, the traveler, as the Plaintiffs in this action found out, was unable to observe the conditions and traffic on the railroad
tracks as to those trains proceeding south on said tracks.
In fact a· clear view north could not be had until the Plaintiffs were almost upon the tracks. This situation ·existed
because of the fill dirt that had been placed as a part of
the overpass construction.
Under these circumstances, we respectfully submit
that the Defendants did have a duty to the Plaintiffs insofar as construction of the road was concerned.. The
duty which the Defendants had was that of an owner or
occupant of the premises to a licensee or invitee to refrain from leading said licensee or invitee into hidden or
dangerous traps and to give timely warning of such peril.
The law of this state is clearly to this effect.
Considering the Plaintiffs in the present case as invitees, and we respectfully submit ·that they may be so
considered, the Defendants were under a strict duty to
refrain from leading them into dangerous traps and to
refrain from exposing them to unreasonable risks; and if
such exists, to give them timely nOtice and warning that
such perils were present on the premises. The duty of
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which we are speaking is set forth in 38 Am. Jur. 754,_ Section 96 as foHorws:
"The rule is that an owner oroccupant of land or buildings who directly or impliedly invites others to enter
for some purpose or interest or advantage to him owes
to such person a duty to use ordinary care to have
his premises in a reasonably safe condition for use in
a manner consistent with the purpose of invitation,
or at least not to lead them into a dangerous trap or
to exp~e them to an unreasonable risk, but to give
them adequate and timely notice and warning of latent or concealed peril which are known to him but
nc,t. to them. Summarily stated to the extent of the
invitation given, the property owner owes to an invitee the duty of pre-vision, preparation and look-out''.
. (Emphasis added)
It is important to note that the invitation need not
be an express one, but may be made by implication as is
noted from the above quotation, and as 38 Am. JUT. 758,
Section 98 says:
"A person may become an invitee to whom the owner
of the premises is under a duty to maintain them in a
safe condition when he is expressly invited to come
upon the premises or when from the construction of
buildings or use of the premises, such an invitation
may be implied and invitation to enter may be implied
from conduct of the owner or occupant, or of someone
·else with his permission, which he knows, or reasonably should know, might ·give rise to the belief, in the
mind cf a perso;11 ordinarily discerning, that the owner
or .occupant intended such person to come upon the
premises." (Emphasis added)
· This· is ·the exact position that Plaintiffs are in in the
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Because of the constluction area and the
.. Road Closed" sign, they reasonably discerned that the
road which proceeded to the south and around the construction area was a detour road ·and was put there for
the use of traffic proceeding east on 13th South. Under
these circumstances, they clearly were invited to come
upon these premises by both the Defendants.
pr-esent ease.

This Court in the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug
Company, 120 Utah 31, 232 Pac. 2nd 210, has clearly set
forth the duty which an owner or occupant of property
owes to an invitee. In determining that duty, the Court
quoted with approval from the Restatement of the Law
of Torts, Section 343, as follows:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily
harm caused to business visitors by a natural or arti-

ficial condition thereon if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care
could discover the condition which, if known to him,
he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk
to them. and
(b) Has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or realize the risk involved therein, and
(c) Invites or permits them to enter or remain
upon the land without exercising reasonable care (i)
to make the condition reasonably safe, or ( ii) to give
a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the hann
* * *". (Emphasis added)

The section just quoted above applies to the circumstances of the present case. The Defendants had constructed a road for use in servicing this construction work. By

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

so constructing that road, they had created an artificial
condition which they knew or should have known by the
exercise of reasonable care, was an unreasonable risk to
the traveling public. 'Dhe Defendants, in addition, had no
reason to suspect that the Plaintiffs or any orther traveler
who happened upon that road would realize the risk involved therein, and they further, by clear implication, invited the Plaintiffs upon that road and permitted them to
remain there without exercising reasonable care to make
the condition safe or to give a warning adequate to enable
the Plaintiffs to avoid harm.
A

case which we feel is of significance as related to

the fact situation in the present case is Florez v. Groom
Development Company, 348 Pac. 2nd 200. In that case,
th.e Plaintiff was an employee of a s~b-contractor. He had
brought an action for injuries caused by the negligence
o~. the general contractor. An employee of the general
contractor had placed a plank across a ditch that had
been dug by a plumbing sub-contractor. The plank was
placed in this position in order to assist the painters in the
erection of staging for painting the houses being developed.
The plank that was used was a bit narrower than those
usually used for such a pupose; howeveT, the employee
used this particular size of plank at the request of his employer, the general contractor. As the plank was placed
by the employ-ee, one end led directly to a water faucet,
which was the only source of water within the immediate
vicinity. The staging was completed by the painters on
F-riday, but the plank was left laying across the ditch and
leading to the water faucet until the next Monday, when
the accident occuiTed. The employee knew, and there-
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fore hi.s employer also knew that the plank, being in such
a position, would give those workmen who were in the area
the impression that the plank was placed across the ditch
to enable them to get from one side rto the other, particularly when in need of water. The Plaintiff used the plank
and it gave away, causing him to fall into the ditch and
suffer severe injuries. The Trial Court held for the Plaintiff, and the Defendant appealed.
On appeal, it was held that there was an implied inIf the
plank was placed as the Defendant says, to hold up staging, then after that purpose was fulfilled, the Defendant
had a duty to remove the plank or warn invitees of the
danger in using it for a cross walk. The Defendant had
created this situation and, was, therefore, under a duty to
warn workman. In this regard, the Court said:
\'itation for workmen to use the plank to cross en.

"Moreover, the invitor, under the law, is required to
protect invitees, not only from dangers created by him
or of which he has actual knowledge, but from those
dangers which, by the use of reasonable care, he should
have had knowledge. And lack of actual notice is no
defense it' there was an opportunity to inspect and
such inspection would have revealed the dangerous
situation." (Emphasis added)
Applying the facts of the Florez case to the present
case, we respectfully submit that they are of real significance to the present case. The Defendants, in constructing this road had created an implied invitation to the
Plaintiffs and other travelers upon 13th South to enter
thereon and detour around the construction area. The
road was placed at such a point that it gave a clear im-
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pression that its only purpose was one of detour for the
traveling public. Under such circumstances, the Defendants had a duty to warn the Plaintiffs and other travelers
that it was not meant for that purpose and that entering
thereon would subject the Plaintiffs or others to a danger~
ous situation. In not doing so, the Defendants were neg-ligent.
If we ·consider the Plaintiffs as licensees, the Defendants still owe them a duty to refrain from leading them
into hidden or dangerous traps, and to give timely warming of such peril. In oomenting on this duty, in Tempest
v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2nd 174, 299 Pac. 2nd 124, this
Court quoted with approval from the Restatement of the
Law of Torts, Section 342, as follows:

"Dangerous conditie\DS known to possessor. A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused ·

to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon, only if he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it
involved an unreasonable risk to them and had reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and
(b) Invites or permits them to enter or remain
upon the land without exercising reasonable (i) to
make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to warn
them of the condition and risk involved."
In the present case, the Defendants clearly knew of
the dangerous condition which existed by reason of the
fact that the road was constructed where it was and that
it involved an unreasonable risk to the traveling public in
general and the Plaintiffs in particular, and they certainly
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had reason to believe that Plaintiffs would not discover
that condition or realize the risk involved therein. Defendants also, by implication, invited and permitted the
Plaintiffs to enter and remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care to make the conditions safe or to
warn them of the condition and risk involved therein. Under these circumstances, we respectfully submit that even
considering the Plaintiffs as licensees, the Defendants weTe
nevertheless under a duty to the Plaintiffs and were negligent in carrying out that duty as set forth above. As
the Supreme Court of Oregon said in the case of McHenry
v. Howell, 272 Pac. 2nd 210, in commenting upon the duties owed to a licensee by an owner or occupant:
"As to Plaintiff, Defendant was subject to the rule of

law that liability of an owner or occupant of premises
to a licensee may be predicated upon negligence in
leaving something in the nature of a trap or pitfall at
a place where his presence might have been anticipated without a warning thereon. A trap within the
meaning of this rule is a danger which a person who
does not know the premises could not avoid by reasonable care or skill." (Emphasis added)
We respectfully urge to the Court that under cither
label, invitee or licensee, the Defendants had a duty to
Plaintiffs insofar as construction of the road was concerned.
That duty being one of refraining from leading Plaintiffs
into hidden or dangerous traps and to give timely warning
of such peril. and the finding of the lower court tha:t no
duty did exist was in error.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
POINT ll

THE COURT ERREID IN GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THlERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT Will:CH EXISTED WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCT10N OF THE
ROAD AND WITH RESPECT TO !DEFENDANTS' DUTIES UNDER DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.
As we indicated in our argument under Point I, the
Defendants did have a duty to the Plaintiffs with respect
to construction of the road. With this duty owing to the
Plaintiffs, issues of fact were present in the case, which
could not be decided by sumrnacy judgment of the Court.
This is dearly the law of. this state as _evidenced by Rule
56c of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedue, wherein it is said:

"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthWitl( if
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if ·any, show that there iS
'no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled w a judgment as a matter of
law." (Emphasis added)
Under the wording of this rule, if it appears that there
is any genuine issue, of a material fact, then a lower court
cannot grant a summary judgment. See Young vs. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 Pac. 2nd 682; In re Williams
Estate, 10 Utah 2nd, 83, 348 Pac. 2nd, 683; Grant vs.
Springville Banking Company, 10 Utah 2nd 350, 353 Pac.
2nd 460; and Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center Incorporated, 11 Utah 2nd, 1 354 Pac. 2nd, 559.
The ·JirSt · issue of fact present in the case was, of
course, whether the Defendants were negligent in carry-
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lng out their responsibilities under the duty which they
owed to the Plaintiffs in constiuction of the road.
The record will disclose that the lower court in its
pre- trial order found that the Plaintiff driver, William H.
Steele, was negligent as a matter of law. This finding, howevt.'r, does not eliminate the second issue of fact present in
the case. That issue of fact being whether the Defendants,
under the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance had an opportunity to a void this accident after Plaintiff's negligence
had begun. In either of the situations where this Court
has said the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies, the
Plaintiff, ·william H. Steele, should have had the oppor..
tunity to present his evidence as bearing upon the issue
as follows: Whether the Plaintiff, William H. Steele had,
by turning down this apparent detoor road placed himself
in a position of inextri.ca:ble peril, or in the alternative, if
he had placed himself in a position where he was merely
inattentive to the surrounding circumstances, and in either
event, if the Defendants or either of them had the last
clear chance to avoid this accident. Under these circumstances, the court could not by merely finding the Plaintiff, William H. Steele, negligent as a matter of law, eliminate this subsidiary issue of fact from the case. Therefore, we respectfully urge this Court that this is a genuine
material issue of fact, and the summary judgment granted
by the Court was in error.
CaSes which have been decided by this Court ·and
which set forth the law in this state with respect to the
IX>ctrine of Last Clear Chance are as follows: Teakle vs.
Railroad, 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 402; Knutson vs. Oregon
Shor11ine Railroad Company, 78 Utah 145, 2 Pac. 2nd 102;
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Compton vs. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company,
120 Utah 453, 235 Pac. 2nd 515; Graham vs. Johnson,
109 Utah 346, 156 Pac. 2nd 230.
Another Utah case which we submit is of particular
significance as related to the position Plaintiffs found themselves in, is the Utah case of Lawrence vs. Hamburger Railrood Company, 3 Utah 2nd 247, 282 Pac. 2nd 335. In this
case this Court clearly sets forth the duties of a Defendant
railroad company as encompassed by the Dostrine of Last
Clear Chance as it applies to a Plaintiff who has negligently
placed himself in a situation of peril. In this respect, the
Court said:
"The ·motorman or engineer operating a train may assume and act in reliance on the assumption that a
person on or approaching a crossing is in possession
of his natural faculties and aware of the situation including the fact that a train is a large and cumbersome instrumentality which is difficult to stop and
that the person will ~ercise ordinary care and take
reasonable precaution for his own safety. If consitent with his duty of due care, anything appears so
that he either knows or should know that there is a
likli:hood of danger to a person near the tracks, it becomes his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give
warnings to slacken his speed and if possible to stop
in time to avert an accident. The duty is measured
by the exigencies of the occasion. For instance, danger would be more readily apprehended if the person
on or near the tracks were a small child or sooneone
possessing an obvious limitation or disability." (Em·phasis added)
It is this latter statement by the Court which is of

significance to the present situation.

The Plaintiffs found
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them:-;t'ives in a (X)Sition where it was not possible for them
to observe the train as it moved south on the Defendants'
railroad tracks. This was a clear and obvious limitation
and disability with respect to their ability to avoid the
accident, and therefore the duty owed by the Defendant
railroad company or Defendant construction company was
that much greater, as indicated by this Court in the Lawrence case.
CONCLUSION

The Appellants respectfully urge this Court to find
that the granting of the summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants was erroneous and without basis for the
following reasons:
1. The Defendants had a duty to the Plaintiffs insofar as construction of the road was concerned.
2. There was a genuine material issue of fact in the
case with respect to the negligence of Defendants in performing the duty owed to Plaintiffs in construction of the
road.
3. There was a genuine material issue of fact present
in the case with respect to the duty of Defendants to Plaintiffs with respect to the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance.

Respectfully submitted,
Jackson B. Howard and
Jerry G. Thorn, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff~
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
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